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BOOK REVIEW
DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
JonathanL. Marshfield*
CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS -

SUBNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Michael Burgess and G. Alan Tarr. McGill-

Queen's University Press. 2012. Pp. 338.
Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems ("Constitutional
Dynamics") is an important contribution to the study of federalism and
constitutional law. It includes thirteen insightful studies analyzing issues of
constitutional change in eleven different political systems from the unique
perspective of subnational law and politics.
I. INTRODUCTION

Although comparative constitutional law has grown wildly as a field of
study in recent decades,' attention is almost always placed on national
constitutional law with little mention of subnational issues.2 This myopia
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. LL.M. New York
University School of Law; J.D. Rutgers University, Camden; B.A. Cedarville University.
1. See Adam M. Dodek, A Tale of Two Maps: The Limits of Universalism in
ComparativeJudicialReview, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 287, 288 (2009) ("The reinvigoration of
comparative law in the early 1990s brought with it... an exponential growth in comparative
constitutional law scholarship.").

2.

See, e.g.,

NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

(3d ed.

2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999);
DONALD P. KOMMERS ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS, CASES, AND
COMPARATIVE NOTES (2d ed. 2004). Although these texts include chapters discussing
federalism and related issues, there have been very few attempts to integrate subnationalism
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often results in an oversimplification of constitutional dynamics. Indeed,
federal constitutional democracies almost always involve an overarching
national constitution that reserves at least some constitutional choices to
subnational units.3 This means that in most federal systems, constitutional
decision-making occurs at both the national and subnational levels. Thus, a
more complete and accurate understanding of constitutional law requires
careful study of subnational constitutional dynamics
as well as the
4
relationship between national and subnational issues.
For example, Nicholas Schmitt explains that in Switzerland, "cantonal5
constitutions have always been in advance of the Federal Constitution."
Schmitt further explains that many of the rights provisions in Switzerland's
paradigmatic 1999 Federal Constitution were first introduced and fleshed out
by popular amendments and revisions to cantonal constitutions. 6 Similarly,
John J. Dinan explains that some of the most important political changes in
the United States, such as the expansion of the suffrage and extension of
individual rights, have been achieved in part through popular changes in state
constitutional law.7 These articles deepen our understanding of how
constitutional norms develop by suggesting that meaningful constitutional
change can occur from the bottom up, and, significantly, through popular
political processes.
into constitutional theory at large. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Models of Subnational
Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 1151,

1164-69 (2011) (explaining subnational

constitutional theory and the need for integration between subnational constitutional theory
and constitutional theory at large).
3. Indeed, as Michael Burgess and G Alan Tarr observe in their introduction to
ConstitutionalDynamics, "in most federal systems the federal constitution is an 'incomplete'
framework document, in that it does not prescribe all constitutional processes and
arrangements." Michael Burgess & G Alan Tarr, Introduction: Sub-national Constitutionalism
and Constitutional Development, in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS SUBNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (Michael Burgess & G Alan Tarr, eds., 2012) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS]; see also Marshfield, supra note 2, at n.33; Donald S. Lutz, The
United States Constitution as an Incomplete Text, 496 ANNALS 23 (1982) (explaining how the
U.S. Constitution is "incomplete" and necessarily relies on state constitutions to complete the
federal system). India, Belgium, and Nigeria are examples of federal systems that do not
permit subnational units to adopt their own constitutions, and, consequently, are "complete"
without subnational constitutionalism. See Burgess & Tarr, supra, at 3.
4. See Burgess & Tarr, supra note 3, at 4 ("[S]ub-national constitutions are 'part and
parcel of the total constitutional structure of federal systems and play a vital role in giving the
system direction."' (quoting DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 174 (1987))).

5. Nicolas Schmitt, New Constitutions for All Swiss Cantons: A Contemporary
Challenge, in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 140, 161.
6. Id.
7. John J. Dinan, State Constitutions and American Political Development, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 43,47-55.
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Jens Woelk's discussion of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides an intriguing
twist on this bottom-up perspective. Woelk explains that BosniaHerzegovina's constitutional structure is primarily the product of
international intervention, which forced previously warring groups into a
complicated federal system. 9 Because "the agents of [constitutional] change
have mostly been external,"'
Bosnia-Herzegovina's primary political
challenge is getting subnational groups to embrace the legitimacy of BosniaHerzegovina's externally imposed system." Woelk's bottom-up perspective
on Bosnia-Herzegovina challenges our understanding of the relationship
between constitutional change and democratic legitimacy by suggesting that
top-down constitutional change may sometimes undermine the legitimacy of
constitutional outputs. 12 Conversely, the articles addressing Switzerland and
the United States suggest that incremental bottom-up constitutional change
can sometimes enhance the legitimacy of new constitutional norms.
This "bottom-up" perspective On comparative constitutional law makes
Constitutional Dynamics a unique and timely contribution. All thirteen
articles in ConstitutionalDynamics focus on a critical question: How do
subnational constitutional law and politics affect constitutional development
and change within a political system as a whole? Although the contributors
approach this question from a variety of different viewpoints, all contributors
recognize that constitutional change cannot be fully understood without
looking at subnational issues. Constitutional Dynamics provides much
needed research and insight into this neglected perspective.
Rather than summarizing all of Constitutional Dynamic's many
contributions, this article focuses on two recurring themes. First, many of the
articles in ConstitutionalDynamics observe that the growth of subnational
8. See Jens Woelk, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Trying to Build a Federal State on
Paradoxes,in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 109.
9. Id. at 109-11 ("[A] peculiar federal system was established that forced the former

warring parties together, made them recognize each other, and provided for some common
institutions.").
10. Id. at 110.
11. Id. at 110-11 ("The challenge for Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to become a
sustainable multinational state is therefore reaching consensus and rallying support for this
state from within its borders.").
12. Scholars have raised a related point in the context of constitutional change in the
United States regarding social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions about
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2074 (2011) ("[T]he Court blundered by issuing a decision that
shut down politics, short-circuiting a process of democratic-based legislative change that

would have been accorded more legitimacy, even by those members of the public who
disagreed with it.").
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constitutionalism has coincided with an expansion of mechanisms for direct
democracy and popular participation in constitutional reform.13 Read
together, the articles suggest a strong correlation between subnational
constitutionalism and popular involvement in constitutional change.' 4 In
other words, bottom-up constitutional change frequently originates with
popular or majoritarian political processes and institutions. 15 Part I of this
article explores the specific evidence presented in ConstitutionalDynamics
of this phenomenon and then offers a few possible explanations for the
correlation between subnational constitutionalism and popular political
involvement.
Second, Constitutional Dynamics suggests that there are at least two
recurring pathways of bottom-up constitutional change. Sometimes, bottom-16
up change occurs when subnational units occupy the constitutional "space"'
13. Eight of the ten country-specific contributions in ConstitutionalDynamics address
this issue to some degree. See Dinan, supra note 7, at 44-47, 55-58; Arthur B. Gunlicks,
Legislative Competences, Budgetary Constraints, and the Reform of Federalism in Germany
from the Top Down and the Bottom Up, in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 61, 63
("Another feature of the constitutions in the new Ldnder was direct democracy .... "); Peter
Bupjager, Sub-national Constitutions and the Federal Constitution in Austria, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 88, 91-92; Schmitt, supra note 5, at 146, 152,
160 (noting that the Swiss cantonal constitutions "are marked by an extension of direct
democracy" and that the wave of recent cantonal constitutional revision has "allow[ed] civil
society to play a major role in drafting the constitution[s]"); Gerald Baier, Canada: Federal
and Sub-national ConstitutionalPractices, in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at
174, 179-80 (noting that provincial-level political groups in Canada have often "identified
themselves with a populist or plebiscitary style of democracy .... "); Stephen Tierney, Quiet
Devolution: Sub-state Autonomy and the Gradual Reconstitution of the United Kingdom, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 195, 212-13 ("[O]ne change that devolution has
brought that may have the most dramatic effect on the United Kingdom's constitutional future
[is] the use of referendums to effect constitutional change."); Caries Viver, Spain's
Constitution and Statutes ofAutonomy: Explaining the Evolution of PoliticalDecentralization,
in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 218, 218-20, 226; Francesco Palermo, Italy:
A Federal Country without Federalism?,in CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 237,
238-40 (explaining that changes to the amendment procedures for regional autonomy statutes
that allow for possible referendum "completely reshaped the constitutional provisions
concerning the relations between the national government and the regions.").
14. Gerald Baier's article regarding Canada illustrates this point well. Baier explains
that although Canada's federal system does not expressly allow subnational constitutionalism,
the groups that have traditionally advocated for greater provincial autonomy have also
See Baier,
"identified themselves with a populist or plebiscitary style of democracy .
supra note 13, at 179-80.
15. See Dinan, supra note 7, at 55-58 (discussing this phenomenon in the U.S. and
assessing various normative criticisms of popular involvement in subnational constitutional
change).
16. See generally Robert F. Williams & G Alan Tarr, SubnationalConstitutionalSpace:
A View From the States, Provinces, Regions, Lander and Cantons, in FEDERALISM,
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provided to them by institutionalizing new constitutional norms.' 7 Those
changes then percolate through the system and eventually result in national
changes. In other instances, especially in systems that offer very limited
subnational constitutional space, subnational units aggressively instigate
bottom-up change by using subnational institutions to cause conflict; either
by constitutional litigation or by applying political pressure for reform of the
national constitution.'8 Part II of this article examines these two pathways
and suggests a few reasons why bottom-up change tends to occur in one of
these two ways.
In all, ConstitutionalDynamics is an important contribution to the study
of constitutional theory, federalism, and comparative constitutional law. It
deepens our understanding of the processes and dynamics of constitutional
change and provides concrete evidence of how subnational political activity
can meaningfully affect the evolution and change of constitutional norms.
All of the contributors to ConstitutionalDynamics approach their material
with great skill and expertise, and Constitutional
Dynamics is a treasure
19
trove of valuable insight and information.
SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 5 (G. Alan Tarr et al. eds., 2004)

(describing the concept of subnational constitutional "space" as the "range of discretion...
available to component units in a federal system in designing their constitutional
arrangements").
17. John J. Dinan's discussion of state constitutions in the United States and Nicolas
Schmitt's discussion of cantonal constitutions in Switzerland provide excellent examples of
this. See Dinan, supra note 7, at 47-55 (discussing how formal amendments to state
constitutions have influenced constitutional change in the United States); Schmitt, supra note
5, at 160-6I (concluding that cantonal constitutions are usually in advance of changes in
Switzerland's Federal Constitution).
18. Arthur B. Gunlicks's discussion of recent reforms to Germany's national
constitutional structure and Italy and Spain's experience with constitutional litigation provide
helpful examples of this pathway. See Gunlick, supra note 13, at 68-70; Viver, supra note 13,
at 231-32; Palermo, supra note 13, at 246-48 ("[C]onstitutional adjudication has shaped the
contours of Italian regionalism much more than constitutional amendments have.").
19. Perhaps the only mild criticism of Constitutional Dynamics is that it is decidedly
Western-centric in its focus. The bottom-up perspective explored in ConstitutionalDynamics
can expose much about constitutional systems in Africa and other regions of the world. See
Christina Murray & Catherine Maywald, Subnational Constitution-Makingin Southern Sudan,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 1203 (2006); L. Adele Jinaduu, The ConstitutionalSituation of the Aigerian
States, 12 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM 155, 158-59 (1982); Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing
Subnational Constitutions in TransitionalFederal States: South Africa, Democracy, and the
KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 621-28 (2008) (discussing
South Africa's constitutional deliberations regarding subnational constitutionalism and the
significance of subnational constitutionalism in the delicately negotiated transition from
apartheid to democracy). But ConstitutionalDynamics does not purport to be an encyclopedia
and its contribution is not undermined by the unavoidable need to focus on a few specific
political systems.
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II. SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POPULAR POLITICAL
INVOLVEMENT

There is a recurring observation in Constitutional Dynamics: across
political systems, subnational politics have become a hotbed for popular
constitutional involvement and activism.2 ° Subnational constitutions seem to
consistently encourage (and even incite) popular involvement in
constitutional law-making and reform. In Switzerland, for example, Nicolas
Schmitt observed that the cantons draft new constitutions "every four to five
years," which has resulted in constitutional debate being "a significant
element of political and legal discussion in the Swiss cantons for many
years.'
This is a meaningful insight when one considers that national
constitutions are notoriously difficult to amend or revise through popular
political processes. 22 For example, since 1987, Denmark, Australia, and
Japan have not amended their constitutions at all, and the U.S. and South
Korea have each adopted only one amendment. The average amendment
rate for all EU countries since 1987 (not including amendments
incorporating EU law) is 0.34 amendments per year. 24 This represents a
relatively static body of constitutional law - at least from the standpoint of
popular involvement. Thus, the observations in Constitutional Dynamics
highlight that subnational constitutions and national constitutions seem to
evolve in different ways and through different political processes. 25
This section provides an overview of the significant observations and
insights included in ConstitutionalDynamics and then explores a theoretical

20. See supra note 13 (listing various references to this correlation in Constitutional
Dynamics).

21. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 141.
22. See John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal Countries,
39 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 841-47 (2008); see also Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner,
Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1600, 1618-19 (2010) ("We know of no
subconstitutional system that is more difficult to amend than that of its superstate.") (emphasis
omitted).
23. See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 22, at 1619; see also Donald S. Lutz, Toward a
Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 355 (explaining through Table C1 the national amendment rates for 32 different countries).
24. See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 22, at 1619 n.109. The amendment rate for the
same countries from before creation of the EU was 0.16 amendments per year. Id.
25. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 355-70 (arguing that constitutional change is necessary
in any system and if amendment procedures are arduous, change will likely occur through
judicial review).
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framework that potentially describes why subnational politics and popular
constitutional involvement appear to be tightly wed.
A. Evidence of a Correlationbetween SubnationalConstitutionalismand
PopularPoliticalInvolvement
Constitutional Dynamics includes articles addressing a variety of
different political systems.2 6 Some systems, such as the United States,
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are formal federal systems that expressly
permit subnational units to adopt their own constitutions. 7 Other systems,
such as Canada, are formal federal systems but they do not expressly allow
subnational units to adopt their own constitutions.28 ConstitutionalDynamics
also includes a fascinating discussion by Stephen Tierney of the United
Kingdom, which is not a formal federal system, but which has experienced a
significant decentralization of political power brought about in part by
bottom-up popular initiatives.29 However, regardless of the formal structure
of the political system, there seems to be a strong correlation between
subnational constitutionalism (whether formal or informal) and popular
political involvement.3 °
1. Political Systems that Expressly Adopt Subnational Constitutionalism
In federal systems that expressly endorse subnational constitutionalism
and allow subnational units to adopt their own constitutions, there is often
popular involvement in formal subnational constitutional law-making. 31
26. In all, Constitutional Dynamics included articles addressing: the United States,
Germany, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Italy, and the European Union.
27. See Marshfield, supra note 2, at n.33 (listing all systems that expressly permit
subnational units to adopt their own constitutions); see also ELAZAR, supra note 4, at 177-78.
28. See Marshfield, supra note 2, at n.33; see also ELAZAR, supra note 4, at 177-78.
29. See Tierney, supra note 13, at 195.
30. In the United States, this activity has been described as a "beehive" of political
activity. See John Kincaid, State Constitutionsin the FederalSystem, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCi. 12, 14 (1988) ("[T]he realm of state constitutional law is a beehive of
activity.").
31. There are currently at least fourteen political systems in the world that permit
subnational units to adopt their own constitutions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil,
Ethiopia, Germany, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, the United
States, and Venezuela. Dinan, supra note 22, at 839-40; see also John Dinan, Patterns and
Developments in Subnational Constitutional Amendment Processes (unpublished paper
presented at Symposium: Redefining the Political Order: New Processes for ConstitutionMaking,
Universite
Naval,
May
15,
2009)
(same)
available
at,
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Perhaps the most powerful illustration of this is John J. Dinan's
discussion of state constitutional politics in the U.S. federal system.3 2 Dinan
notes that the U.S. Constitution has been amended by popular political
33
processes only twenty-seven times, with a total of thirty-three proposals.
This means that constitutional change at the federal level occurs mostly
through judicial interpretation, which is largely insulated from popular
political input. 34 In contrast, since "1776 to the present, the 50 states have

held a total of 233 state constitutional conventions; 146 state constitutions
have been adopted; and over 6,000 amendments have been enacted to the
'
All of that constitutional change represents significant
current documents. 35
popular involvement. 36 Although Dinan recognizes disadvantages associated
with this "state constitutional vitality," he ultimately notes that "the main
effect for the federal system has been that groups who are otherwise unable
to achieve their goals through federal governmental processes have been
advantaged by the flexibility of state constitutional processes. 37 In other
words, in the U.S. federal system, federal constitutional change is effectively

http://www. fss. ulaval. ca/cms recherche/upload/chaire democratie/fichiers/article_d
inan._27082009_160838.pdf.
32. See Dinan, supra note 7, at 43.
33. Id. at 46. This number is somewhat artificial from the standpoint of amendments
through ordinary political processes because of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments. See Harry L. Witte, Rights,
Revolution, and the Paradoxof Constitutionalism: The Processes of ConstitutionalChange in
Pennsylvania,3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 396 (1993). The first ten amendments were adopted
as part-and-parcel of ratification pursuant to the Massachusetts compromise between the
federalists and anti-federalist. See generally D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 73 (1990). Three more of the amendments were imposed on the

southern states after the Civil War. Id. at 253-339. Thus, in a sense, the Constitution has been
amended by the ordinary political processes outlined in Article V only fourteen times in its
more than two-century existence.
34. See Lutz, supra note 23, at 355-70 (arguing that constitutional change is necessary
in any system and if amendment procedures are arduous, change will likely occur through
judicial review); Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 22, at 1593 (explaining that necessary
constitutional change can occur through "informal" amendment by judicial interpretation); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY, 17-31 (2006) (recounting how federal constitutional change necessarily occurs
through practical judicial decision making because the Federal Constitution is "extremely"
hard to amend).
35. See Dinan, supra note 7, at 46.
36. Id. at 55-58; see generally, JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION 29-63 (2005).
37. Dinan, supranote 7, at 56.
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insulated from popular constitutional involvement (especially for certain
groups), but state constitutional change is a "beehive" of popular activity.38
Austria provides a second example of how subnational constitutions and
national constitutions seem to evolve in different ways and through different
political processes. 39 As Peter Bu[jager explains, Austria's federal system
has strong unitary features and the Lander have relatively limited subnational
constitutional space within which to operate. 4 0 However, despite these
limitations, Buo3jdger notes that since the early 1980s, the Lander have
introduced a series of constitutional reforms, including "the establishment of
more mechanisms for direct democracy," state policy directives (or "state
goals"), fundamental rights, and structural changes designed to control
parliamentary power.4 1 All of these reforms were done by formal amendment
to the Lander Constitutions, which generally require a two-thirds majority
vote of the Lander Parliaments. 2 Significantly, Bupjager notes that although
popular constitutional change has occurred "step-by-step" at the Land level,
efforts of popular constitutional reform at the federal level have universally
failed.4 3 In other words, as in the United States, popular involvement in
constitutional law-making occurs mostly at the subnational level in Austria. 44
Switzerland provides a final and particularly interesting example.
Switzerland's National Constitution requires all twenty-six cantons to adopt
their own constitutions.4 5 Significantly, the Federal Constitution and cantonal
constitutions are both relatively easy to amend and the amendment
procedures for the Federal Constitution and cantonal constitutions are
effectively the same.46 Moreover, as Nicolas Schmitt points out, Switzerland
has a particularly strong tradition of popular involvement in law making in
general.4 7 However, notwithstanding Switzerland's political culture favoring
38. See Kincaid, supra note 30, at 14.
39. See Buf3jdger, supranote 13, at 88.
40. Id. at 88 (explaining that "the division of competencies provides relatively few
opportunities for Ldnder to enact legislation."); id.at 90 (explaining that "the constitutions of
the Ldnder may codify anything insofar as they do not contradict federal constitutional law").
41. Id. at93-100.
42. See Dinan, supra note 22, at 846.
43. Bul3jdger, supra note 13, at 101, 104.
44. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 140.
45. Id.at 141.
46. See Dinan, supra note 22, at 843 ("At the federal level, constitutional changes can
be proposed either by the legislature or through initiative petition and be must ratified by a
majority of the people and by voters in a specific majority of cantons. Cantonal constitutions
vary in their specific amendment procedures, but they all resemble the federal constitution in
permitting amendments to be proposed by initiative petition.").
47. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 146 (stating that direct democracy is "so important in
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public involvement and the parity between national and subnational
amendment processes, there has been significantly more public involvement
in subnational constitutional change than national constitutional change.
Indeed, since 1848, Switzerland has had only three national constitutions
with a relatively low amendment rate,48 but "new cantonal constitutions are
drafted every four to five years" 49 and recent years have seen a
"mushrooming" of activity around cantonal constitutions.50 Thus, as Schmitt
notes, the flurry of cantonal constitution-making in recent years has offered
"a unique opportunity to strengthen the bonds between the population and its
5
canton., 1
Switzerland's experience is particularly interesting because it suggests
that even in a political system with a culture that promotes public
involvement and a national constitution that provides real opportunities for
popular constitutional change, most public involvement in constitutional law
occurs at the subnational level.5 2 This begs the question of what happens in
political systems that do not expressly allow for subnational
constitutionalism. ConstitutionalDynamics provides several important casestudies addressing precisely that scenario.
2. Political Systems that do not Expressly Adopt Subnational
Constitutionalism
Many political systems (and even some federal systems) do not expressly
endorse subnational constitutionalism and do not allow subnational units to
adopt their own constitutions.5 3 However, the material in Constitutional
Switzerland"). Indeed, unlike the federal constitutions in the United States, Russia, and
Germany, Switzerland's Federal Constitution provides its own mechanisms for direct
democracy. Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 22, at 1598.
48. Lutz, supra note 23, at 355.
at Table 6.1 (providing critical data on
49. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 141-42; see also id.
canton constitutions).
50. Id.at 140.
51. Id. at 147.
52. Pursuant to the Federal Constitution, the adoption of a new canton constitution and
even the slightest amendment to a canton constitution requires a full public referenda in the
canton. Id.at 152. This "means that any change in the wording of the canton's constitution is
at any time fully legitimated by a popular approval." Id.at 152.
53. There are currently at least six federal systems that do not permit subnational units
to adopt their own constitutions or provide individualized regional autonomy statutes. Those
systems are: Belgium, Nigeria, India (with an asymmetrical exception for Kashmir), Comoro
Islands, Pakistan, and United Arab Emirates. See Marshfield, supra note 2, at n.33; ELAZAR,
supra note 4, at 177-78. Australia, Canada, Italy, and Spain have provided regional autonomy
statutes for subnational units. See ELAZAR, supra note 4, at 177-79.
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Dynamics suggests that those structural limitations do not dissipate the
energy and demand for popular constitutional involvement. Rather, popular
constitutional involvement finds new outlets through mechanisms such as
constitutional litigation and informal expression of subnational
constitutionalism.
For example, beginning in the 1970s, Italy adopted national legislation
that created several ordinary "regional states., 54 Those "regional autonomy
statutes" ' 55 operate somewhat like constitutions for their respective states
because they "benefit from a special entrenchment that makes it extremely
difficult" for a subsequent Parliament to amend them. 56 However, under the
initial scheme, there was no formal mechanism for the affected subnational
community to participate in the drafting, ratification, or amendment of the
statutes because the statutes were purely an act of the national Parliament.57
One might expect that this structure would dissipate regional enthusiasm
for self-governance and popular involvement in constitutional issues.
However, the opposite seems to be true. As Fransesco Palermo explains,
following Italy's initial limited experiment with ordinary regional autonomy
statutes, some of the regions sought to expand their autonomy by using one
of the only avenues available to them for participating in constitutional
change: litigation. 58 Several regions sought to strengthen their powers by
challenging national legislation in the Constitutional Court.5 9 As a result,
there has been a "permanent increase in the regional powers .

[that was]

very much determined by constitutional adjudication. 60
Interestingly, in 2001, Italy's National Constitution was amended to
provide a process by which the Parliaments in the ordinary regions can
participate in the ratification of their own autonomy statutes. 6' As Palermo
notes, this and other related amendments "completely reshaped the . . .
54. Italy's decentralization is expressly asymmetrical because it provides two separate
sets of rules for "special regions" and "ordinary regions." See Palermo, supra note 13, at 23839. Special regions have slightly more autonomy than ordinary regions. Id.
55. Id.at 238.
56. See id.

57. See id.at 239-40, 246.
58. See id.at 239 (stating that there has been a "permanent increase in the regional
powers . . . [that was] very much determined by constitutional adjudication."); id.
("[C]onstitutional litigation was the only instrument regions could use to strengthen their
powers.").
59. See id.
60. Id. One of Palermo's principal conclusions is that "constitutional adjudication has

shaped the contours of Italian regionalism much more than constitutional amendments have."
Id.at 248.
61.

Id.at 240, 246.
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relations between the national government and the regions., 62 The ordinary
regions now have a constitutionally protected right to participate in the
evolution of their constitutional structure through majoritarian institutions.
Stephen Tierney's discussion of decentralization in the United Kingdom
is particularly interesting in this regard.63 The United Kingdom is perhaps the
most unlikely of political systems with which to associate subnational
constitutionalism and popular constitutional involvement. 64 This is because
Parliamentary Supremacy is a central doctrine in English constitutional law.
Parliamentary Supremacy generally provides that Parliament, and only
Parliament, can make or unmake law for the United Kingdom. 65 As a result,
English constitutional structure has a standing presumption against
66
decentralization and direct popular involvement in constitutional change.
However, as Tierney explains, since the 1950s, the United Kingdom has
experienced an "organic emergence" of bottom-up, popular pressures for
decentralization, particularly from Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.67
According to Tierney, "sub-state nationalism" in those three territories has
effectively leveraged existing administrative institutions to obtain a form of
subnational constitutionalism. 68 For example, beginning in the late 1980s,
there was increasing support in Scotland for greater self-governance,
including the creation of a Scottish Assembly that could enact laws for
Scotland. 69 Various civic and political actors mobilized an "extraparliamentary" campaign that produced several detailed documents outlining
a decentralization proposal for Scotland.7 ° Ultimately, the national
government converted that proposal into a white paper and put it to
referendum in Scotland, which the Scottish people approved.71 Parliament
subsequently enacted the Scotland Act of 1998, which essentially adopted
the proposal and provided Scotland with a degree of self-governance. 72

62. Id. at 240.
63. See Tierney, supra note 13, at 195.
64. See id. at 203-06.
65. Id. at 203.
66. See id. at 203-06.
67. See id. at 200.
68. Id. at 201 ("[T]his political nationalism was able to present constitutional
aspirations that already had an institutional base, in the form of administrative devolution,
upon which to draw.").
69. Id.
70. Id. at201.
71. Id. at202.
72. Id.
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Similar processes occurred in Northern Ireland and, to a lesser extent, in
Wales.
What is most striking about Tierney's discussion is his observation that
notwithstanding the continued significance of Parliamentary Supremacy,
"devolution has further consolidated the practice of using referendum for
major constitutional issues. ,,74 Tierney observes that there is now an
increased expectation in the United Kingdom that constitutional changes,
especially changes related to decentralization, will ultimately be put directly
to the people (rather than solely to Parliament) for ratification.75 Tierney
concludes that this has "created a broader political culture of popular
participation in major areas of constitutional reform. 76 Tierney further
concludes that "devolution and the sub-state constitutions it brings with it has
had an irreversible impact on the substance of constitutional change at the
center, and most likely, the very process by which such change is likely to be
effected., 77 The United Kingdom's experience with decentralization further
illustrates that subnational constitutionalism and popular processes of
constitutional change tend to go hand-in-hand.78
B. Unique Incentives Affecting SubnationalConstitutionalChange and
Politics
The above discussion suggests that there is often greater energy and
enthusiasm for popular involvement in constitutional politics at the
subnational level than at the national level. As a result, constitutional change
at the subnational level seems to occur most often through popular or
majoritarian political processes rather than judicial interpretation. This
section explores several factors that may explain this trend.
In short, it seems likely that subnational constitutionalism and popular
political involvement are linked because opportunities for self-governance
and self-determination tend to mobilize subnational communities, lower
agency costs at the subnational level allow for more fluid constitutional
change, and smaller democratic scale provides real incentives for popular
involvement in subnational constitutional law.
73. Id.at 201-03.
74. Id.at213.

75.
76.
77.
78.
observes

Id.
at213-14.
Id.
Id.
at214.
Gerald Baier's piece regarding subnational constitutionalism in Canada also
that there is a connection between direct democracy and sub-state nationalism. See
Baier, supra note 13, at 179-180.
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1. Self Governance, Self-Determination, and Political Mobilization
The empirical literature on public choice suggests that citizens and
groups are more likely to mobilize when the issues involved are significant
to them.7 9 This is a very intuitive notion: people are more likely to get
a real opportunity to influence an issue or outcome that
involved if they 8have
0
them.
to
matters
This notion may partially explain the enthusiasm for subnational
constitutional politics. As Professor Tarr has argued, the "fundamental
purpose of subnational constitution-making" is the exercise of "the basic
political right . . . of self-determination-the power to determine the
fundamental character, membership, and future course of their political
society."'8' This right presumably matters a great deal to individuals and
subnational groups that exist within a larger political community where
subnational preferences are diluted and opportunities for self-determination
are limited. 82
Providing subnational communities with opportunities to govern
themselves (even bounded opportunities) seems to have a mobilizing effect.
Foundational issues such as individual rights and government structure tend
to solicit significant public interest and mobilize grass-roots political
participation because they touch on issues of identity and self-governance.8 3

79. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON

PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207, 221-22 (Anne O'Connell & Dan Farber, eds. 2010)
(citing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)).

80. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1070 (1980)
("[n]o one is likely to participate in the decision-making of an entity of any size unless that
participation will make a difference...").
81. See G Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights: A Perspective of
Canadian Provincial Constitutionalism, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 767, 783 (2009). This right is
"inevitably limited when nations are constituent members of a larger political entity, but it is
not effaced." Id.
82. See Marshfield, supra note 2, at 1153-1164 ("Subnational constitutions are
derivative of both internal and external political communities. This is true regarding the
content of subnational constitutions as well as their democratic legitimacy.").
83. See Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295 (presenting significant data regarding direct democracy
initiatives in the U.S., including data regarding signature campaigns and other grass roots
forms of political activity); see also Elizabeth Garret & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the
Initiative and Referendum Process: Evidence of its Effects and Prospectsfor Reform, in THE
BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING (M. Dane Waters, ed. 2001) (concluding that special
interest do not ultimately control direct democracy in state politics).
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It is not surprising, therefore, that there seems to be a correlation between
popular political involvement and subnational constitutional issues.
2. Reduced Democratic Scale
Another factor that may explain the correlation between popular political
involvement and subnational constitutional politics is democratic scale.
There is solid evidence that citizen participation tends to increase as
jurisdiction size decreases. 84 The general explanation for this is that people
are more likely to participate in political processes that are easy for them to
access and involve issues and people that are closer to their every day lives. 85
In economic terms, people chose to participate in political processes that
86
have low participation costs combined with relatively immediate benefits.
It seems plausible that popular involvement in subnational constitutional
politics is partially the result of reduced democratic scale at the subnational
level. Individuals seem more likely to get involved in local issues for a
variety of reasons: local officials are more accessible, local political issues
are more salient, and individual involvement in local politics is more likely
to have an impact than involvement in national politics. 8 7 Additionally,

subnational groups are more likely to have success in smaller jurisdictions
simply because there are fewer factions to dilute electoral preferences and
the costs for political campaigning are less. All of these factors suggest that
there are greater opportunities and real incentives for popular involvement in
constitutional politics at the subnational level than at the national level. This
may partially explain why there is a correlation between popular political
involvement and subnational constitutional issues.
3. Reduced Agency Costs at the Subnational Level
In an important article, Eric Posner and Tom Ginsburg seek to explain
why subnational constitutions universally seem to be amended more
84. See Hills, supra note 79, at 214-18.
85. Id. (citing ROBERT DAHL & EDWARD TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 62-65 (1973);
Daniel J. Elazar, Cured by Bigness: Toward a Post-TechnocraticFederalism, in THE FEDERAL
POLITY (Daniel J. Elazar, ed. 1973)).
86. Id.; see Hills, supra note 79, at 216 (citing DAHL & TUFTE, supra note 85, at 62-65)
("[R]educing the size of constituencies and increasing the number of officials greatly reduces
the costs of such activity.").
87. As Gerald Frug claims, "[no] one is likely to participate in the decision-making of
an entity of any size unless that participation will make a difference .... Frug, supra note 80,
at 1070.
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frequently than national constitutions. 88 Indeed, as noted earlier, national
constitutions tend to be relatively hard to amend,
but subnational
89
frequently.
revised
and
amended
be
to
tend
constitutions
Posner and Ginsburg conclude that the fundamental difference between
subnational constitutionalism and national constitutionalism is that
subnational constitutions involve mitigated agency costs. 90 That is, the
structuring (and restructuring) of national power by means of a constitution
involves greater risk of government abuse than does the structuring (and
91
restructuring) of subnational power by means of subnational constitutions.
Posner and Ginsburg conclude that agency costs are far greater at the
national level because: (1) national constitutions must place limits on
theoretically unlimited government power, but subnational constitutions
already operate within a legally defined space; (2) there is no effective
enforcement mechanism operating above the national constitution, but
national government provides an effective monitoring and enforcement
mechanism regarding subnational abuses of constitutional
space; and (3)
92
subnational units risk losing citizens to neighboring units.
Because agency costs are reduced at the subnational level, Posner and
Ginsburg observe that there is an inevitable disparity in constitutional
stability between "states" and "substates." 93 High agency costs mean that
national constitutional constraints must be relatively strong, static, and
difficult to change. 94 Subnational constitutions, however, can be relatively95
more fluid and responsive to public input because agency costs are lower.
The basic intuition is that there are strong incentives for a national
constitution to be stable in its creation of core government institutions and
protection of essential individual liberties. And, a stable national constitution
creates a safe place for subnational units to engage in constitutional
experimentation because inappropriate experiments will be corrected by
88. Ginsburg & Posner, supranote 22, at 1584.
89. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
90. Ginsburg & Posner, supranote 22, at 1584-85.
91. In economic terms, agency costs are defined as: "the sum of (1) the monitoring
costs expended by the principal to limit misappropriations by the agent, (2) the bonding
expenditures by the agent to demonstrate loyalty, and (3) the residual loss in the form of selfserving behavior on the part of the agent." Robert F. Weber, StructuralRegulation as Antidote
to Complexity Capture, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 643, 652 (2012) (citing Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976)).
92. Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 22, at 1596-97.
93. Id. at 1593-94.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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enforcement of the national constitution's overarching rules. 96 The important
implication of this is that subnational constitutions provide better (and safer)
opportunities for public participation than national constitutions.
Posner and Ginsburg's hypothesis has compelling empirical support. In
all federal systems that permit subnational constitutionalism, subnational
constitutions are easier to amend and amended more frequently than their
overarching national constitution. 97 Moreover, as discussed above, even in
systems that do not expressly permit subnational constitutionalism, there is a
compelling correlation between subnational constitutional change and
popular political involvement. 98 Thus, reduced agency costs are one factor
that may explain the correlation between popular political involvement and
subnational constitutional change.
III. PATHWAYS OF BOTTOM-UP CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN FEDERAL
SYSTEMS

Another recurring theme in Constitutional Dynamics is the way
subnational activities can affect constitutional change in the federal system
as a whole. 99 This section examines some of the evidence in Constitutional
Dynamics and suggests that bottom-up constitutional change seems to occur
in at least two different ways. First, bottom-up change can occur when
subnational units formally adopt new constitutional laws that percolate
through the federal system and result in constitutional change at the national
level. This can happen through a variety of different political processes, but
the core feature is that subnational institutions introduce a new constitutional
output into the federal system, which then has ripple effects (or information
externalities) that inform formal constitutional laws elsewhere in the system.
96. See Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradoxof Constitutionalism:The
Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 475 (1993)
(explaining a conclusion regarding the U.S. federal system that "our federalism permits
vigorous popular democracy to operate in the states because the Federal Constitution places
checks on majoritarian excesses.")
97. Dinan, supra note 22, at 841-47; Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 22, at 1593-94.
South Africa represents somewhat of an exception to this rule because only two provinces
have adopted constitutions and only the province of the Western Cape has survived review by
the Constitutional Court. See Dirk Brand, The Western Cape Constitution, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
961, 961 (2000).
98. See Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism,
28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 800 (1997) (discussing the relationship between agency costs and direct
democracy).
99. This is one of the primary focuses of ConstitutionalDynamics. See Burgess & Tarr,
supra note 3, at 3-4.
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This can be called the "filter" pathway of bottom-up constitutional change.
Second, bottom-up change can occur in more direct and conflict-based ways;
namely constitutional litigation and/or threats of destabilizing or grid-locking
the system as a whole. The core feature of this pathway is that subnational
units or groups leverage constitutional change at the national level by using
subnational institutions to cause conflict. This can be called the "agitation"
pathway of constitutional change.
A. The FilterPathway of Bottom-Up ConstitutionalChange
Systems that allow subnational units to adopt and amend their own
constitutions provide opportunities for subnational units to contribute to the
evolution of constitutional norms in the system as a whole. New
developments in constitutional norms benefit from opportunities to be
formalized and endorsed by legitimate political institutions.100 In other
words, institutional recognition can facilitate the development of
constitutional norms. 01 This can occur in at least two ways.
First, institutionalization of a new norm provides an opportunity to test
the viability, relevance, and efficacy of the norm at issue. When new
constitutional norms are institutionalized, observers can evaluate whether the
change is beneficial, whether it is relevant to them, and whether it is
practically feasible given their circumstances. 10 2 Bottom-up constitutional
100. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453, 471, 474-76 (1997) (explaining how law can operate as a norm-shaping tool in the
criminal law context); see generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 338-402 (1997).
See generally Adam M. Samaha, Regulating for the Sake of Appearance, 125
101.
HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1566, 1574-80 (2012) (explaining that expression of norms by legal
institutions can have an appearance that can drive the ultimate acceptance and legitimacy of
the norm, i.e., the "reality" using Samaha's term).
102. The micro-economic concept of positive externalities is helpful here. A positive
externality occurs when parties receive benefits from an activity that they themselves did not
have to pay for. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 199 (6th ed. 2012)
(defining positive externalities as arising from activities that yield benefits to parties who do
not pay to receive them); see also Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL.
ECON. 1126, 1127-28 (1992) (discussing positive externalities in context of urban dwelling).
In this context, a subnational unit generates positive information externalities when it adopts a
new constitutional norm). That action provides other subnational units and the national
government with information regarding the norm that those institutions can use to evaluate the
norm, but for which they did not have to pay by implementing the norm themselves (costs
associated with implementing a norm include the risk that it is detrimental, resource costs
associated with enacting and administering it, and opportunity costs associated with diverting
government action from other issues). This is, perhaps, an economic formulation of Justice
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change can begin when one subnational unit institutionalizes a change, and,
as other subnational units and the national polity learn from that experience,
the norm can filter up (and out) until it is institutionalized or rejected at the
national level.
Second, institutionalizing constitutional norms can have a socialization
effect that facilitates constitutional change. 103 There can be many barriers to
entry for constitutional changes. One barrier may be the illegitimacy that a
political culture associates with a particular constitutional change, which
frustrates the collective action necessary in a democracy to embrace the new
norm. °4 This perception of illegitimacy can be maintained (and likely will
be) as long as the norm is not institutionalized. 0 5 However, once a norm
finds an institutional home - in a subnational constitution for example perceptions can1 6begin to change and this can facilitate broader acceptance of
the new norm.

0

Brandeis' famous analogy comparing the United States to a laboratory for legal and social
experimentation. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandies, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
103. This is related to the idea that norms need to be internalized to become effective.
See Robert D. Cooter, DecentralizedLaw for a Complex Economy: The StructuralApproach
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1690-94 (1996) ("[A] social
norm is ineffective in a community and does not exist unless people internalize it.").
104. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943, 999 (1995) ("In defending a social meaning, structures of social stigma are already
built in, while in attacking a social meaning, one must both overcome the existing structures
of social stigma and implement new structures in line with one's desired meaning."); id. at
962-90 (exploring how institutionalization of norms through adoption of formal rules can
affect the perception of those norms).
105. Id. at 999 ("This is not to say that defensive construction [of existing norms] will
always succeed, or that offensive [construction of new norms] will always fail, but that
defensive construction does not face as severe a collective action problem as does offensive
construction.").
106. See generally id. at 1009 15 (explaining techniques for changing social meaning
that include the technique of "tying," which attempts to change a social norm by associating a
new unaccepted norm to an existing accepted institution, thereby causing observers to project
the legitimacy of the existing norm onto the new norm); id. at 1010 ("Whether negative or
positive, tying functions by focusing a meaning-by making an association that clarifies the
meaning along some dimension, sometimes by implicitly breaking another link that before
existed."); see also McAdams, supra note 100, at 400-07 (explaining how law signals
consensus regarding its content in a democracy). For example, it is interesting that the Swiss
Canton of Fribourg was the first government in the world to constitutionally recognize samesex marriage, and it was done not by judicial action but by the adoption of a new
constitutional provision. See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 161. This action may have had a
signaling effect that challenged ideas of illegitimacy associated with such constitutional
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Constitutional Dynamics provides some compelling examples of the
filter pathway. John J. Dinan provides evidence of at least four general
categories of changes that state constitutions have facilitated in the United
States.07 First, Dinan notes that the general structure of American
government captured in the United States Constitution was greatly
influenced by the early state constitutions, which experimented rather wildly
with various different structural arrangements. 10 8 Second, Dinan notes that
the Federal Constitution did not originally set a national suffrage
requirement.' 0 9 Although many states initially imposed property and taxpaying suffrage requirements, "[s]tate constitution-makers gradually
removed these sufferance restrictions and achieved universal white male
suffrage by the 1850s, without passage of any federal constitutional
amendments."" 0 State constitution makers also took the lead in extending
the suffrage to African Americans until the Fifteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was adopted."' Dinan also notes that state
of other individual
constitutions have played a leading role in the expansion
2
1
reforms."
policy
public
of
enactment
the
rights and
Switzerland provides another stark example of the filter pathway of
bottom-up change. 113 As Schmitt observes, cantonal constitutions are very
fluid and very responsive to popular input. 1 4 In fact, the cantons adopt new
constitutions almost every four to five years.' 5 This constitutional activity in
the cantons has had a profound effect on Switzerland's Federal
Constitution.' 16 Indeed, Schmitt observes that "cantonal constitutions have
always been in advance of the Federal Constitution. For instance, popular
rights have often been developed at the cantonal level and then adopted later
by the Confederation."' 17
provisions.
107.

See Dinan, supra note 7, at 55.

108. Id.at 48; see generally, G ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS
60-94 (2000) (discussing early state constitutional development vis-A-vis the United States
Constitution); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 125-562 (1998)
(discussing as well early state constitutional development vis-A-vis the U.S. Constitution).
109. See Dinan, supra note 7,at 49-50.
110. Id. at 50.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at51-52.
113. See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 140.
114. See id. at 140-41.
115. See id.
at 140.
116. See id. at 161.
117. See id.("This was also the case for a certain number of rights granted first at the
cantonal level and then recognized by the Federal Tribunal and, in the end, enshrined in the
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Switzerland also illustrates the socialization function of institutionalizing
new constitutional norms at the subnational level. As Schmitt notes, in May
2004, the canton of Fribourg adopted a constitution that was the first in the
world to formally recognize same-sex marriage. 18 Although there is
currently no federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage in Switzerland,
in January 2007, the Federal Partnership Act gave same-sex couples many of
the same rights provided to heterosexual couples." 9
B. The Agitation Pathway of Bottom-Up ConstitutionalChange
Bottom-up constitutional change can also occur through less formal
means. This is particularly true in systems that do not expressly allow
subnational units to adopt their own constitutions or do not provide
subnational units with much "constitutional space." In those systems,
subnational units are less likely to be at the forefront of institutionalizing
new constitutional norms because their legal ability to do so is severely (if
not entirely) limited. Nevertheless, bottom-up constitutional change can still
occur by other means. Specifically, subnational units can capitalize on
opportunities such as constitutional litigation and political campaigning to
bring subnational constitutional issues to the forefront of the national agenda.
This pathway is fundamentally different from the filter pathway because it
involves offensive leveraging or instigation of constitutional change at the
national level by subnational units.
ConstitutionalDynamics contains several very interesting examples of
the agitation pathway of bottom-up constitutional change. In Germany, for
example, the Ldnder operates mostly to administer federal laws, with very
little law or policy-making authority of their own.' 20 There has been growing
discontent in many Ldnder regarding their limited constitutional space within
Germany's federal system.12 1 Thus, in the fall of 2003, the Federalism
22
Commission was formed to consider reforms to Germany's federal system.'
The Federalism Commission was controlled primarily by the Lander
because the federal government did not have any voting members on the
new 1999 Constitution.").
118. Id. at 161.
119. See generally Kenneth Mck Norrie, Recognition of Overseas Same-Sex
Relationships in New Zealand, 23 N.Z.U.L.R. 339, 340 (2009).

120. See Gunlicks, supra note 13, at 62-63 ("In Germany... dual federalism means
that the federal executive and legislative branches of government are responsible for most
legislation, and that the Ldnder generally administer the laws.").
121. Id. at 68.
122. Id.
at 69.
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commission. 123 Although the Commission initially could not reach a

consensus regarding reform proposals, 124 its work was revived in 2005 and a
series of reforms were proposed. One of the key proposals was "to
redistribute" legislative powers between the central government "to give the
Lander additional responsibilities and therefore strengthen" their role. 125 The
proposal gave the Ldnder additional law-making authority. 26 The proposals
were ultimately adopted in 2006 and resulted in meaningful expansion of the
constitutional space afforded to the Lander.127 Germany's experience
powerfully illustrates the agitation pathway of bottom-up change because the
Ldnder were able to join together
and leverage a series of significant changes
128
in Germany's federal structure.
The United Kingdom presents another example. 129 As discussed above,
although the United Kingdom does not formally recognize subnational
constitutionalism and is not a formal federal system, Wales, Northern
Ireland, and Scotland were able to mobilize grass-roots support for
decentralization of law-making power. 3 ° Their efforts resulted in extraParliamentary proposals for decentralization that were ultimately adopted by
Parliament as national legislation. 131
Spain provides an important illustration of how constitutional litigation
by subnational units can effectuate bottom-up constitutional change. 32 Spain
does not formally allow subnational constitutionalism, but it recognizes
several "autonomous communities" by national statutes of autonomy for
those communities. 33 Those statutes operate somewhat like subnational
constitutions, but they are ultimately enacted by the national
34 legislature and
not directly and independently by the autonomous regions.'
123. Id.
124. Id. at 69-70.
125. Id. at 70-71.
126. Specifically, the Lnder were given additional legislative authority "over a
number of environmental matters and in areas such as punishment for crimes, highereducation law ... and financing of higher-education, retirement and nursing homes, storesclosing hours, restaurants ... the promotion of public housing, and the salaries and benefits
for judges and public employees at the Land and local levels." Id at 73.
127. Id. at 71-73.
128. Id. at 69 (stating the reform was not a "top-down" exercise).
129. See Tierney, supra note 13, at 195.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 200-03.
132. See Viver, supra note 13, at218.
133. Id. at218-19.
134. Id. at 226 (explaining that statutes of autonomy "require the consent of the
Spanish Parliament, which has to approve them as its own laws").
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Spain's national constitution authorizes the central government to set the
"bases" for regulating various matters that are within the authority of the
autonomous regions. 135 This so-called "framework legislation" is intended to

guide

the autonomous

regions

in enacting

appropriate

subnational

36

legislation.
The Spanish Constitution does not define the scope of the
"bases.' 37 As a result, the Spanish Parliament has taken a very broad
definition of its own power, which "has profoundly affected the distribution
of power between central government . . . and the autonomous
communities."'' 38 Consequently, the autonomous communities have
(and defend) the scope of their authority under
frequently sued to determine
39
Constitution.
Spanish
the
Spain's overall constitutional structure presents another illustration of
how the agitation pathway of bottom-up change may operate. The statutes of
autonomy are proposed by the autonomous communities, but they must be
passed by a simple majority of the Spanish Parliament as national
legislation. 40 The Spanish Parliament includes representatives from the
autonomous communities. 4' This creates a situation where representatives
from the autonomous communities can, in effect, sponsor the introduction of
new national legislation. 42 Once that legislation is introduced, it becomes
another bargaining chip for representatives, which potentially provides them
with an opportunity to leverage concessions from other representatives. 43 in
this way, the autonomous communities can indirectly leverage changes44at the
national level by introducing changes to their own governing statutes.
135. Id.at231.
136. Id. at230.
137. Id. at231.
138. Id. at231.
139. Id. at 232 ("Spain's Constitutional Court has been called on to settle conflicts
between central institutions and the autonomous communities on a number of occasions.").
140. Id. at 226.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 226-27.
143. Id.at 227;
[I]f the proposal for reform that they put forward has strong has strong political and
popular support, in practice they can exert an important influence on the central
institutions' final decision. Indeed, these institutions can block the process if they
disagree with the proposed reform, completely or partially, although this may come at
a high political price.
Id.
144. Id.The structure of Germany's national legislature can also provide opportunities
for this sort of leveraging by the Lander See Gunlicks, supra note 13, at 69 ("When the
Bundersrat [(the legislative body that represents the Lander)] is used as an instrument of
opposition, there is a 'structural break' between the federal state and party competition and a
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Italy's experience presents an interesting hybrid agitation pathway of
bottom-up constitutional change. 145 Like Spain, Italy has autonomy statutes
that govern various autonomous regions. 146 Several of those statutes can be
amended by the corresponding regional parliament and those amendments
become law unless the national government147 chooses to challenge the
amendment before Italy's Constitutional Court.
In 2006, the autonomous region of Sardinia, a large but remote island,
created a commission to draft "the new statute on autonomy and sovereignty
of the Sardinian people."'' 48 As Palermo notes, the terminology was "clearly
aimed at provoking a debate."' 49 The national government immediately
challenged the Sardinian law before the Constitutional Court. 5 ° The Court
held that the law was unconstitutional because it claimed to divide Italy's
sovereignty between subnational units, which was contrary to the centralized
and individual sovereignty established by the Italian Constitution.' 5 ' The
Sardinian incident is interesting because it represents the enactment of a
positive subnational constitutional law for the express purpose of creating a
constitutional conflict with the national government.' 52 Although the
Constitutional Court's ruling did not result in an affirmative change in Italy's
constitutional order, it served to further articulate and define the parameters
of Italy's decentralization.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional Dynamics is an important contribution to the study of
federalism and constitutional theory. This article has attempted to illustrate
the depth of its contribution by discussing a few recurring themes. However,
the contributors to Constitutional Dynamics present with great skill and
thoroughness the complexities of constitutional change in federal systems.
ConstitutionalDynamics highlights the importance of studying constitutional
issues from a bottom-up perspective and provides invaluable insight and data
regarding constitutional change from this essential but neglected perspective.
limitation on the policy-making capacity and ability to act of the federal government.")
(emphasis added).
145. Palermo, supra note 13, at 246.
146. Id.
147. Id.at 246.
148. Id. at 247 (internal citation omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.

